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DEVELOPING "TORT" STANDARDS 
FOR THE AWARD OF MENTAL DISTRESS DAMAGES 
IN STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION ACTIONS 
Affronts to dignity are compensable by monetary damages for "mental 
distress" 1 through various tort actions. 2 Some courts recently have rec-
ognized significant similarities between the emotional injury suffered by 
victims of such "dignitary"3 torts and the emotional injury suffered by 
persons aggrieved under federal and state discrimination statutes. 4 In-
creasingly, victims of discrimination have sued successfully under these 
statutes for mental distress damages. 5 
1 "Mental distress" takes many forms and is referred to by many names. The injury 
discussed in this article is primarily one that is not caused by physical injury. Mental distress 
is therefore distinguished from "pain and suffering," which is typically compensated in 
personal injury actions. See w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 46-62, 330-35 
(4th ed. 1971). The "mental distress" of discrimination will refer here principally to the 
affront to dignity and the disruption of mental tranquility that accompanies the recognition 
of one's inferior treatment by reason of membership in a statutorily suspect class. The most 
distinctive components of the injury are often described as embarrassment, humiliation, 
outrage, loss of dignity and disappointment. 
2 See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 528 (1973), noting common law 
cases where damages for the vindication of "dignitary interests" have been awarded for 
assault, ·battery, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, and alienation of affections. 
The most common "dignitary" actions, however, are defamation, see, e.g., Collins v. Retail 
Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Thomas v. E. J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. 
Supp. -1163 (E.D. Pa. 1971); and the intentional infliction of mental distress, Meyer v. 
Nottger, 241 N. W.2d 911 (1976); Newby v. Alto Riviera Apts., 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. 547 (1976). 
3 The term "dignitary tort" is borrowed from C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORTS 961 (2d ed. 1969), and Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n. JO 
(1974). 
• In support of his conclusion that there is a right to trial by jury under the Civil Rights Act 
of 1968, Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1977), the federal fair housing law, Justice 
Marshall favorably compared housing discrimination suits to tort actions, particularly those 
of defamation and intentional infliction of mental distress. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 
196 n. 10 (1974). In Rogers v.Exxon Research and Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 
1975), mental distress award vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 749 
(1978), the court characterized the AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, 29 U .s.c. 
§§ 621-34 (1975), as a new "statutory tort." 
5 Under federal statutes, victims of discrimination have experienced their greatest success 
in the area of housing discrimination, both under Title VIII, Jeanty v. Mc Key & Poague, 
Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973); 
Morehead v. Lewis, 432 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 
618 (E.D.N.C. 1974); and in racial discrimination cases, under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1974) alone 
or in conjunction with Title VIII; Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977); Crumble v. 
Blumenthal, 549 F .2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Anchor Building Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th 
Cir. 1976); Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1975); McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc., 
372 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976); 
Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mo. 1974); Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34 
(N.D. Ohio 1976); Clemons v. Runck, 402 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Allen v. Gifford, 
368 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973). See also Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976); Marr 
v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974). Section 1982 also provides a mental distress remedy for 
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The relation between tort remedies and discrimination has been 
racial discrimination in access to privately owned and operated recreational facilities, 
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assoc. ,Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973), on remand, 367 F. 
Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973) (mental distress damages awarded). 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974) has 
served a similar function in the private school context, McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 . 
(4th Cir. 1975), affd, 427 U.S. 160, 166 n.4 (1976) (without discussion of mental distress 
damages). 
The availability of mental distress damages under federal employment discrimination 
statutes is uncertain. Most courts have held that no mental distress remedy lies under 
§ 2000e-5(g) of Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U .S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1974), which 
authorizes courts to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may 
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees ... or any other equitable 
relief as the court deems appropriate" (emphasis added). See Pearson v. Western Electric 
Co., 542 F.2d 1150 (IOthCir. 1976); EEOC v. Detroit Edison, 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.1975), 
vacated on other grounds and remanded, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Bradshaw v. Zoological 
Soc'y of San Diego, 10 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 1268 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Alexander v. Consoli-
dated Freightways, 421 F. Supp. 450 (D. Colo. 1976); Gillin v. Federal Paper Board Co., 12 
Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 1329 (D. Conn. 1975); Coilier v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, 13 Fair Empt. 
Prac. Cas. 88 (S.D. Ga. 1976); Curran v. Portland Superintending School Comm., 435 F. 
Supp. 1063 (D. Me. 1977); Yerrell v. Maryland Highway Admin., 13 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 
1746 (D. Md. 1976); Whitney v. Greater 'N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. 
Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Wright v. St. John's Hospital, 414 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Okla. 
1976); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 71 F.R.D. 34 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Jiron v. Sperry 
Rand Corp., JO Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 730 (D. Utah 1975); but see Humphrey v. Southwest-
ern Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 
F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974), and Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 5 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 393 
(D.D.C. 1972), affd 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ($500 "additional damages for harrass-
ment" awarded for threats of violence directed toward a woman who had filed an EEOC 
complaint). Most commentators have been critical of the courts' refusal to find mental 
distress remedy under section 2000e-5(g). See Note, Damages for Federal Employment 
Discrimination: Section 1981 and Qualified Executive Immunity, 85 YALE L. J. 518, 520 
(1976); Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title Vil, 54 VA: L. 
REv., 491, 498 (1968); Comment, Title V/1 and 42 U.S.C. § 198/: Two Independent Solu-
tions, 10 U. RICH. L. REv. 339, 352-53 (1976); Comment, Employment Discrimination 
Litigation: The Availability of-Damages, 44 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 497 (1976). 
The Supreme Court has indicated in dictum that the remedial provision of Title VII is 
independent from that of§ 1981, and that "[a] n individual who establishes a cause of action 
under section 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, 
under certain circumstances, punitive damages." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court's dictum is in direct 
opposition to the positions of at least three federal courts: Reaves v. Westinghouse Electric 
Corp., 430 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Wisc. 1977); Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 
854 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Tooles v. Kellog Co., 336 F. Supp. 14 (0. Neb. 1972), but is consonant 
with the weight of critical opinion. Se.e, e.g .. Larson, The Development of Section /981 as a 
Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 56 
(1972);Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 27 ARK. L. REV. 603 (1973). In Marshall v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 413 F. 
Supp. 663 (D. Del. 1976), a court relying on Johnson granted defendant's motion forajury 
trial on plaintiff's claim for mental distress damages under section 1981 for racial discrimina-
tion in employment. Similarly, in Stith v. Manor Baking Co., 15 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 511 
(W.D. Mo. 1976), a court, citing Johnson, denied defendant's motion to strike a claim for 
compensatory damages under§ 1981. See also Balmes v. Board of Educ. of Cleveland City 
School Dist., 436 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (motion to strike claim for compensatory 
damages denied); Miller v. Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 76 F.R.D. 135 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (plaintiff 
entitled to jury trial on compensatory damage claim). 
Courts are sharply divided on the availability of mental distress damages under§ 626 (c) of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1975), which 
provides for civil actions for "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes" 
of the Act (emphasis added). The Third Circuit's opinion in Rogers v. Exxon Research and 
Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3431 (1978), reversing the 
cogent district. court opinion holding mental distress damages available under the ,'.\DEA, 
404 F. Supp. 324 (U.N.J.1975), has been followed by a number of cou~s. Dean v. American 
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examined extensively, 6 yet there has been little consideration of this 
relationship with respect to appropriate evidentiary standards for the 
Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L. W. 3518 (1978); Ellis 
v. Phillippine Airlines, 17 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 67 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Hannon v. Continental 
Nat'I Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977); Postemski v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 16 
Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. 565 (D. Conn. 1977); Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 
428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Ore. 
1977); Cavanaugh v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Jaeger v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 16 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 569 (E.D. Wisc. 1978); see also Sant v. 
Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal:1976), but has been rejected in favor of the 
logic of the district court opinion in Rogers by other courts, Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminat-
ing Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976), affd (reconsidered in light of Third Circuit 
opinion in Rogers), 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 
433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); see also Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 
841 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977); 
Buckholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 16 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 1084 (E.D. Wisc. 1978). 
State anti-discrimination statutes have provided awards of mental distress damages in a 
number of cases. In the·housing context, mental distress have been awarded in at least three 
states, Massachusetts Comm'n. Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 357 Mass. 112, 256 
N.E.2d 311 (1970); Williams v. Joyce, 4 Ore. App. 482, 479 P.2d 513 (1971); State Human 
Rights Comm'n v. Pauley, 212 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1975), and have been awarded for 
discrimination in public accommodations in a comparable number of states, Amos v. Prom, 
Inc., 115 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Batavia Lodge No. 196, Loyal Order of Moose v. 
N.Y.S. Division of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25, 316 N.E.2d 318 (1974); 
Browning v. Slenderella Sys. of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959). 
State employment discrimination laws have been of most value to victims of discrimina-
tion because of the difficulties of obtaining mental distress damages under federal employ-
ment discrimination statutes, Loomis Electronic Protection, Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341 
(Alas. 1976); Boumewood Hosp. v. Massachusetts Comm'n. Against Discrimination, 358 
N.E.2d 235 (1976); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 151 N.J. Super. 15, 376 A.2d 
535 (1977); Harvard v. Bushberg Bros., Inc., 137 N.J. Super. 537, 350 A.2d 65 (1975); 
Broadway Realty, Inc. v. N.Y. State Division of Human Rights, 376 N.Y.S. 2d 17, 49 App. 
Div. 2d 422 (1975); School Dist. No. I, Multnomah Co., Ore. v. Nilsen, 17 Ore. App. 601, 
523 P.2d 1041 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 271 Ore. 461, 534 P.2d 1135 (1975). See also 
Branham v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 15 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. 111 (E.D. Mich. 1977); CAL. 
Civ. CODE§ 52(a) (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REv. STAT.§ 515-13(b)(7) (1976); IDAHO CODE 
§ 67-591 I (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-6(k)(I) (Bums Supp. 1977); KY. REV. 
STAT. §§ 344.230(3)(h), 344.450 (1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 37.2605(2)(i), (2)(k), 
37.2803 (Supp. 1977-78); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.127 (Vernon Supp. 1978); MoNT. REV. 
CODES ANN.§ 64-309(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. I 1977); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 651.090 (1977); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN.§ 4112.051(E) (Baldwin 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(c) (Purdon 
Supp. 1977-78); R. I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-S(L)(a) (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 13-7-4(c) (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495b (Supp. 1977), tit. 9, § 2461 (Supp. 1977); 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.225 (Supp. 1976). 
6 Much of the discussion concerning the implication of tort remedies into federal discrimi-
nation statutes has centered upon 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. 1977), which provides in relevant 
part that 
in all cases where [the laws of the United States] are not adapted to the object, or 
are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish 
offenses against the law, the common law, as modified and changed by the con-
stitution and statutes of the [forum] State ... so far as the same is not inconsistent 
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and 
govern ... in the trial and disposition of the cause .... 
In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), the Supreme Court inter-
preted § 1988 to mean "that both federal and state rules on damages may be utilized, 
whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes." Id. at 240. Interest-
ingly, few articles have considered § 1988 as a source of damage standards of liability; 
rather, it has been looked to as a source of implied substantive damage remedies for statutes, 
such as TITLE VII, which do not expressly provide full compensatory remedies. See, e.g .. 
Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, supra note 5 at 
499-501. Similar arguments have been based on Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 
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award of mental distress damages in discrimination cases. 7 This article 
will consider such standards.8 After briefly tracing the history of mental 
distress award standards in discrimination cases, this article will critically 
examine present compensatory approaches in such cases and suggest an 
alternative philosophy more consonant with tort compensation principles. 
I. PRESENT STANDARDS FOR THE AWARD OF MENTAL 
DISTRESS DAMAGES IN DISCRIMINATION CASES 
A. Early History 
Many present notions regarding the compensation of the psychological 
element of the discrimination injury derive from judicial conceptions of 
mental distress developed prior to Brown v. Board of Education 9 and the 
modem federal civil rights statutes. 10 In early cases under state discrimi-
nation laws, the courts often applied rigorous "intentional infliction of 
mental distress'' 11 standards to the determination of emotional distress 
liability. For example, in two early cases under state public accommoda-
tions statutes, 12 courts in Iowa and Washington looked to further evi-
dence of the "outrageousness" of the defendants' actions to support a 
mental distress award even though illegal discrimination had been proven. 
In doing so, the courts focused upon whether the discrimination had been 
effected by a recognizably "rude" act accomplished in the presence. of. 
hearing of others. 13 The Supreme Court of Washington further required 
evidence of "severe" emotional distress; "mere" feelings of embarrass-
ment or disappoifltment were not sufficient. 14 The Washington court 
expressly rejected plaintiff's suggestion that victims of unlawful discrimi-
nation could be presumed under Washington law to have suffered mental 
U.S. 488 (1957), which held that courts should "fashion from the policy of our national labor 
laws" the substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act. Id. at 456. See Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination under Title 
Vil, supra note 5 at 501-03; Theis, Shaw v. Garrison: Some Obsen•ations on 42 U.S.C. 
§ /988 and Federal Common Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 681 (1976). 
1 A notable exception is an excellent article by Lichtman, The Cost of Housing Discrimi-
nation: Assessment of Damages and Attorney's Fees for Violations of the Civil Rights Act 
of /866 and the Fair Housing Act of /968, 10 SUFFOLK L. REv. 963 (1976). 
8 This article does not deal, however, with the availability of mental distress damages 
generally or under particular statutes. See notes 5 and 6 supra. Rather, it will analyze the 
standards applied by courts in cases under statutes already ir.terpreted to provide such 
damages. 
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See especially id. at 494, n. I I, often regarded as the genesis of 
modem legal concern for the psychological effects of discrimination. 
10 See. e.g., Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1974); Title 
VIII, Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1977). 
II See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 and Comments d and k (1965); PROSSER, 
supra note I, at 49-62. 
12 Amos v. Prom, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Browning v. Slenderella 
Systems of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959). 
13 See Amos, 115 F. Supp. at 133 ("public and illegal acts,"); Browning, 341 P.2d at 
863-65. 
14 See Browning, 341 P.2d at 865. 
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distress worthy of substantial monetary compensation. 15 Perhaps because 
of such rigorous evidentiary standards, mental distress awards under 
early state discrimination laws were infrequent. 16 
After Congress expressed a national policy against many types of 
discrimination in 1964, 17 examination of the characteristics of the dis-
crimination setting and the discriminator's conduct became less important 
in evaluating mental distress claims. The fact of unequal treatment itself 
was increasingly considered to be the primary source of emotional dis-
tress .18 This change in judicial focus better accommodates the peculiar 
nature of discrimination injury, although the shift of emphasis has not 
been unanimous. 19 The humiliation and loss to dignity felt by a victim of 
discrimination is often unrelated to the "politeness" with which entitle-
ments were denied or even to the inconvenience incurred in a later search 
for alternative housing, employment, or accommodation. 20 Actionable 
discrimination has recently been found in totally "polite" contexts, 
where the victim confirms his suspicions of discriminatory motive or 
systemic discriminatory effect long after the facially netural, yet dis-
criminatory action was committed.21 Moreover, in housing and public 
accommodations contexts where the financial costs of finding alternative 
services are often low and the restoration of denied opportunities is often 
impractical, psychological injury may well be the only significant element 
of compensatory damage in a discrimination action and may be the 
element most important to the victim's sense of justice and legal vindica-
15 The Court suggested, however, that the character of such discrimination, its natural 
consequences, and the difficulties of proving damages might support a presumption of 
mental distress in the absence of contrary precedent. Id., at 865-66. 
16 See cases cited in ANNOT., 40 A.L.R.3d 1290 (1970). But see Cook v. Patterson Drug 
Co., 185 Va. 516, 39 S.E.2d 304 (1946) (white plaintiff recovered mental distress damages 
because he was treated as if he were black); Alabama & V. Ry. Co. v. Morris, 103 Miss. 511, 
60 So. 11 (1912) (mental distress damages for defendant's failure to observe segregation 
laws, forcing plaintiff to associate with blacks; $15,000 jury verdict reduced to $2,000 on 
appeal). 
17 See Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
18 Cf. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2369-70 (1964): "The primary 
purpose of [Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act] then, is to solve this problem, the 
deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments. Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is 
the humiliation, frustration and embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is told 
that he is unacceptable as a member of the public because of his race or color." 
19 Application of "intentional infliction" standards now occurs almost exclusively in state 
anti-discrimination cases, see, e.g., Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 53, 
224 N.W.2d 389 (1974); Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 265 A.2d 404 
(1970); Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977), is a recent case 
expressly rejecting the application of intentional infliction standards in a damage action 
under§ 1983 for violation of first amendment rights. 
20 See Colley, Civil Actions for Damages Arising Out of Violations of Cil'il Rights, 17 
HASTINGS L.J. 189, 200-01 (1965); Note, Minority Workers and the Continuing Effects of 
Racial Discrimination - The Limits of Remedial Treatment, 58 IOWA L. REV. 143 (1972). 
21 In many housing discrimination situations, see cases cited in note 5 supra, where the 
prospective tenant is merely informed that no apartments are availabale, the offensiveness 
of the lessor's "facially neutral" act is realized only after the cooperation of a civil rights 
organization investigator reveals that the availability of the apartment was misrepresented. 
Similarly, there is nothing per se rude or outrageous in the receipt of a "pink slip" or a denial 
of admission to a private school. 
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tion.22 Virtually all courts now agree that such feelings of humiliation and 
injustice are compensable injuries under various anti-discrimination sta-
tutes, regardless of whether the defendant's illegal discriminatory con-
duct was otherwise "outrageous" .23 
B. Present Standards 
Although most courts have nominally discarded the intentional inflic-
tion of mental distress analysis in discrimination cases, suspicion con-
cerning the genuineness and seriousness of alleged mental distress still 
influences the evidentiary standards for mental distress awards in dis-
crimination cases. This suspicion remains despite judicial language rec-
ognizing that mental suffering, embarrassment, and humiliation are "di-
rect," "proximate," or "natural" consequences24 of discriminatory con-
duct. Because victims of discrimination carry the burden of proving the 
genuineness and seriousness of their mental distress without the benefit of 
evidentiary presumptions, damage claims under Title VIIl25 and the 
nineteenth century civil rights acts26 bear resemblance to most tort bodily 
injury actions. 27 Indeed, to the extent that courts in discrimination cases 
have required certain "guarantees of genuineness, " 28 such as medical 
evidence of physical manifestations of distress, these cases resemble 
actions under the emerging theories of reckless or negligent infliction of 
mental distress29 which have evolved simultaneously with the rejection of 
22 Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 
27 ARK. L. REV. 603, 606-7 (1973). 
23 Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973); Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F. 
Supp. 1305, 1310 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (mental distress damages available even though discrimi-
nation "was perpetrated in a courteous manner and was not vindictive."). 
24 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1089 (4th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Joyce, 4 Ore. 
App. 482, 479 P.2d 513, 523 (1971); Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 
440, 451, 341 P.2d 859, 866 (1959), see note 15 supra. 
25 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1977). 
26 The relevant provisions of the 1866 and 1871 Civil Rights Acts are now codified as 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981-88, cf. notes 5 & 6 supra. 
27 See PROSSER, supra note I, at 208-09, 330-31. 
28 Id., at 327-35. 
29 The "reckless or negligent infliction of mental distress" is gaining recognition in two 
types of cases. First, where a plaintiff, though not injured physically, was the primary victim 
of a defendant's negligence, courts have uniformly required proof of anxiety-related physi-
cal symptoms as a "circumstantial guarantee" of the mental distress claimed. See, e.g., 
Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 ( 1976). The few ancient exceptions to this 
rule, including cases of the negligent transmission of a death message and the negligent 
handling of a corpse, in which the genuineness of mental distress has been presumed from 
the nature of the negligent act, have not lost their vitality. although they are generally 
recognized in only a minority of jurisdictions. See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 
N.E. 2d 590 (1975). In the second type of case in which the "negligent infliction" cause of 
action has been recognized, the plaintiffs mental distress is caused by witnessing an injury 
negligently or intentionally inflicted upon another person. Most courts have found such 
injuries unforeseeable and have refused any compensation. The few courts which have 
provided compensation have imposed the circumstantial guarantee requirements suggested 
by Prosser's review of the cases. See PROSSER, supra note I, at 334-35. To warrant 
compensation. a plaintiff must prove not only an emotional response so severe as to 
generate actual physical injury. but also a close, usually immediate, family relationship with 
the primary victim and facts that tend to demonstrate the plaintiffs contemporaneous 
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the tort "impact rule"30 in many jurisdictions. 
I. Proving Mental Distress-Medical evidence although seldom desig-
nated a prerequisite to recovery, 31 has played an important role in almost 
all large mental distress damage awards in discrimination cases.32 The 
number of cases in which plaintiffs have presented medical evidence of 
mental distress, however, is extremely small.33 Mental distress, although 
severe, is not always manifested in physical symptoms.34 Even if symp-
toms are apparent, victims may not seek help for a number of practical 
reasons, including prohibitive cost, embarrassment, and feelings that the 
discrimination injury is medically illegitimate, not serious, or untreata-
ble.35 
In the absence of medical evidence, a victim must rely on circumstan-
tial evidence to support his claim of mental distress. A victim's personal 
sensory observation ofthe'primary victim's injury. Krouse v. Graham, 57 Cal. App. 3d 752, 
129 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 
1022 (1977); Gustafson v. Faris, 67 Mich. App. 363, 241 N.W.2d 208 (1976). 
30 The "impact rule", discredited in many jurisdictions, see,e.g., Battalla v. State, IO 
N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, (1961); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 
261 A.2d 84 (1970), essentially mandated that a plaintiff could collect damages for mental or 
emotional disturbance predicated upon a defendant's negligence only if accompanied by a 
bodily impact to the plaintiff. See, e.g., 2.elinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 
351 (1961). 
31 Seaton v. Sky Realty, Inc., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974) (no medical prerequisite); 
Broadway Realty, Inc. v. N.Y. State Division of Human Rights, 49 App. Div. 2d 422, 376 
N. Y.S.2d 17 (1975) (requirement of corroboration, either by medical proof or by circumstan-
tial guarantees of genuineness). 
32 In Rogers v. Exxon Research and Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), extensive 
medical testimony cataloguing a series of serious anxiety-related afflictions was presented, 
and the plaintiff was awarded $750,000 for mental distress, the first six-figure mental distress 
damage award ever returned in a discrimination case. The trial judge remitted the jury 
verdict to $200,000, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently vacated the award 
on statutory grounds, 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977). In other cases, evidence of hospitaliza-
tion, loss of appetite, and headaches has helped victims of discrimination win more moder-
ate awards for mental distress under anti-discrimination statutes. Allen v. Gifford, 368 F. 
Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973) ($3500); Zahorian v. Russell Fit Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 
301 A.2d 754 (1973) ($750). 
Two recent cases, whose accounts are unclear concerning the presence of medical 
evidence at trial, pose a potential and welcomed challenge to this proposition. See Coates v. 
National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977) ($15,000 awarded to each of 
two plaintiffs under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Harrison v. Otto G. 
Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 430 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1977) ($5000 awarded to single 
housing discrimination plaintiff). 
33 Cf. notes 31-32 supra. 
34 In Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976), a television 
anchorman discharged from his job on the basis of his age testified that he had suffered such 
symptoms as insomnia, depression, indigestion, and loss of weight as a result of his 
termination. Id. at 847. The Court, commenting that there was "no evidence of any physical 
injury or need for a physician's care", id. at 847, awarded the plaintiff only $500 in mental 
distress damages, indicating that even the term "physical symptoms" can be narrowly 
construed by courts in the discrimination context. 
35 In Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Ohio 1975), a tenant who witnessed her 
landlord's racially motivated refusal to rent an apartment to a prospective tenant testified 
that she "wrote letters to her family and talked to school and civil rights officials to work out 
the conflict and distress she felt." Id. at 1306. It is likely that many victims of discrimination 
tum to similar sources for consolation rather than to more expensive and more stigmatizing 
"medical" sources. 
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testimony, describing his unfair treatment and his resultant feelings and 
exhibiting his general demeanor, is often the only evidence he can pro-
vide.36 Courts additionally have considered the plaintiffs expectation of 
receiving equal treatment, evaluating this expectation in light of the 
nature of the service defendant provides and its advertised availability to 
the public.37 The extent to which the defendant directly exposed a plain-
tiff to public embarrassment in denying services or entitlements38 and the 
inconvenience experienced t;,y the plaintiff in searching for alternative 
services39 may provide further evidence of mental distress. 
In some jurisdictions, a victim of discrimination may be required to 
show that his mental distress was not attributable to unusual personal 
sensitivity. The plaintiffs evidentiary burden in this regard has been 
defined inconsistently in some jurisdictions. For example, in 1974, the 
New York Court of Appeals held that circumstantial testimony must 
persuade the fact-finder that a "reasonable person of average sen-
sibilities" could fairly be expected to suffer mental anguish from the 
defendant's actions.40 One year later, a lower state court, ostensibly 
applying the Court of Appeals standard, held that a plaintiffs mental 
anguish need only be "understandable under the circumstances" to be 
compensable.4' In a number of jurisdictions, fact-finders have considered 
the sensitivity of the victim, citing past experiences with discrimination or 
other predisposing circumstances, in augmenting the plaintiffs mental 
distress damage award. 42 In one New Jersey case, however, a plaintiff's 
36 Lichtman, supra note 7, at 67, attributes much of the failure of mental distress claims in 
housing discrimination cases to the necessity of fact-finders "to rely heavily on personal 
experience as a guide to assessing damages." Often such testimony is quite dramatic, see, 
e.g., Smith v. Anchor Building Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. 
Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976), but has been largely ineffective in generating large mental 
distress awards. See notes 48-50 infra. 
37 Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assoc., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973). 
38 Seaton v. Sky Realty, Inc., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff humiliated in the 
presence of his children); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 468 
P.2d 216 ( 1970) (employee humiliated in presence of other employees). 
39 Seaton v. Sky Realty, Inc., 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974) ("several trips to and from 
the home site and the offices of the defendant"); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 618, 
623 (E.D.N .C. 1974) ("considerable extra time in locating an apartment"). 
40 Batavia Lodge No. 196, Loyal Order of Moose v. New York State Div. of Human 
Rights, 43 App. Div. 2d 807, 350 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1973), mental distress damages authorized 
on appeal. 35 N.Y.2d 143, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25, 316 N.E.2d 318 (1974). The quotation is from 
the dissenting opinion of Marsh, J. in the lower court decision. 43 App. Div. 2d 807, 350 
N. Y .S. 2d 273, 278 (1973) whose standard was adopted by the majority on appeal, 316 N .E. 
2d 318, 318-19. 
41 121-129 Broadway Realty. Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 49 App.Div. 
2d 422, 424. 376 N.Y.S. 2d 17. 19 (1975). See also Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 
384 (10th Cir. 1973). 
42 Steele v. Title Realty Co .. 478 F.2d 380. 384 (10th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff "not a stranger" 
to acts of discrimination. having been denied housing facilities on the basis of race "in 
college towns across the country ... on a number of occasions"); see also Harrison v. Otto 
G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co .. 430 F. Supp. 893. 897 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (plaintiff "had lived in 
racially mixed neighborhoods with no problems"); Zamantakis v. Commonwealth Human 
Rights Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107. 111, 308 A.2d 612. 613 (1973) (plaintiff had 
recently returned from Vietnam and was "quite upset to find the freedom for which he had 
fought was being denied him here in ihe United States"; damage verdict vacated, however, 
on statutory grounds). 
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impressive academic record and "exceptional character" were cited in 
mitigation of his mental distress damage award, because such qualities 
were assumed to better equip a person to weather feelings of disappoint-
ment. 43 The latter holding is unusual, but it does point out a potential 
dilemma for the plaintiff's attorney. If the attorney presents evidence of a 
client's sensitivity to discriminatory treatment, the fact-finder may con-
clude that the victim's mental distress was not that of a "reasonable 
person of average sensibilities." On the other hand, if the attorney puts 
forth evidence of the client's dignified status and refinement in an effort to 
emphasize the insulting nature of the client's inferior treatment, the 
fact-finder may decide that the client was able to endure discriminatory 
treatment without substantial injury. 
A victim of discrimination may also fail to recover mental distress 
damages unless he can prove that his distress was proximately caused by 
the defendant's discrimination. For example, medical testimony concern-
ing physical manifestations of psychological stress has been frequently 
challenged on the basis that certain symptoms cannot be directly traced to 
a defendant's actions or to emotional upset at all. Such challenges have 
achieved significant success in mitigating damage awards. 44 
There is a division of authority as to whether mental distress suffered 
by a plaintiff during the trial of a discrimination case is a compensable 
injury. Some courts have found such injury an inevitable and compensa-
ble consequence of a discriminator's wrongdoing, 45 while another court 
has held that such irtjuries are merely the normal results of litigation and 
noncompensable. 46 
2. Mental Distress Awards-Mental distress awards in discrimination 
cases appear to be less on the average than in analogous tort cases.47 
43 In Grayv. Serruto Builder, Inc., l!ON.J. Super. 297, 265 A.2d404, 416(1970), the New 
Jersey Supreme Court disregarded medical evidence of mental distress to limit the plaintiffs 
damages to $500, citing plaintiff's "exceptional character," impressive academic achieve-
ments, and significant athletic prowess in support of its assertion that plaintiff "is a man not 
likely to be bowled over by a single set-back," a "strong man, not ... [a] weakling." 
44 Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974); Zahorian v. Russell Fit Real Estate Agency, 
62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973); Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 265 
A.2d 404 (1970). 
45 Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 618, 623 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (mental distress compen-
sation for humiliation of defendant exploration of plaintiff hygienic matters during trial). See 
also Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 430 F. Supp. 893, 897 (N.D. Ohio 1977) 
(citing "the mental and nervous strain that litigants always undergo" in support of its mental 
distress award). 
46 School Dist. No. I, Multnomah Co., Ore. v. Nilsen, 271 Ore. 461, 485-86, 534 P.2d 
1135, 1146 (1975). 
47 There is no conclusive data concerning the average size of mental distress awards in 
either discrimination or other dignitary tort cases. Many of the decided cases are not 
reported, and many other cases are settled prior to litigation through negotiations which 
consider potential mental distress. Even in reported cases, the portion of a compensatory 
damage award attributable solely to mental distress is often not stated. Compare, however, 
the discrimination cases cited in note 52 infra with Clark v. I.H. Rubenstein, Inc., 335 So. 2d 
545 (La. App. 1976) ($500 for wrongful detention ofless than five minutes, due to shoplifting 
accusation); Hayes v. Dompe, 331 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 1976) ($500 damages for embar-
rassment and distress following wrongful seizure of furniture); Columbus Finance, Inc., v. 
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Individual plaintiffs have received compensation of$1000 or less in nearly 
three-quarters of the more than thirty-fi~e reported discrimination cases 
awarding mental distress damages.48 All of the awards of less than $1000 
Howard, 38 Ohio App. 2d 7, 311 N.E.2d 32 (1973) ($760 for mental distress and public 
humiliation due to wrongful attachment of automobile); Moore v. Greene, 431 F.2d 584 (9th 
Cir. 1970) ($1000 damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Booty v. Am. 
Finance Corp. of Shreveport, 224 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 1969) ($1000 for creditor coercion); 
Cohen v. Varig Airlines, S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 85 Misc. 2d 653, 
380 N.Y.S. 2d 450 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1975), modified, 88 Misc. 2d 998, 390 N.Y.S.2d 515 
(1976) ($1750 award for airline's tortious conversion of passenger's baggage including mental 
distress damage; award reduced by $250 on appeal); Blinick v. Long Island Daily Press 
Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 2d 254, 323 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1971), appeal dis-
missed, 71 Misc. 2d 986, 337 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1972) ($4250 to each of two defendants for 
erroneous embarrassing publication); Broughton v. State, 37 N .Y. 2d 451, 373 N .Y.S. 2d 87, 
373 N.E. 2d 310 (1975), cert. denied sub nom., Schanberger v. Kellogg, 423 U.S. 929 (1975) 
($5000 for mental anguish, humiliation, and false imprisonment); Dotson v. McLaughlin, 216 
Kan. 201, 531 P.2d I (1975) ($8000 award for invasion of privacy, vacated on substantive 
grounds on appeal); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973' ($10,000 for invasion 
of privacy); Jones v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 459 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1972) ($10,000 "actual 
damages" for slander; separate additional awards for medical expenses and loss of consor-
tium); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ($10,000 
damages for intentional infliction of mental distress); Holcombe v. Whitaker, 294 Ala. 430, 
318 So. 2d 289 (1975) ($20,000 for fraud in inducement to marry, and assault); Green v. 
Meadows, 527 S.W. 2d 496 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1975) ($20,000 for injury to "feelings, name 
and reputation" resulting from malicious embezzlement prosecution); Womack v. Eldridge, 
215 Va. 338, 210 S.E. 2d 145 (1974) ($45,000 jury verdict against private investigator who 
fraudulently gained permission to photograph plaintiff and used the pictures in an embarras-
sing manner); see also Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), vacated and 
remanded, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) ($100,000 libel verdict includes compensation for mental 
anguish and humiliation). 
48 Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir.), affd, 545 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1976) ($1); State 
Human Rights Comm'ns v. Pauley, 212 S.E. 2d 77 (1975) ($100); Williams v. Joyce, 4 Ore. 
App. 482, 479 P.2d 513 (1971) ($200); Zamantakis v. Commonweath Human Rights Comm'n, 
10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107, 308 A.2d 612 (1973) ($250); Batavia Lodge No. 196, Loyal Order of 
Moose v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y. 2d 143, 359 N.Y.S. 2d 25, 316 
N .E. 2d 318 (1974) ($250); Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 357 
Mass. 112, 256 N.E. 2d 311 (1970) ($250); Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977) 
($500); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976) ($500); 
Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Ohio 1975) ($500); Seaton v. Sky Realty, Inc., 491 
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974) ($500); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 393 
(D.D.C. 1972) ($500); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St. 2d 217, 313 N.E.2d 3, 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975) ($500); State Division of Human Rights v. Great Atlantic 
& Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 46 App. Div. 2d 1001, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 105 (1974) ($500); Gray v. 
Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 265 A.2d 404 (1970) ($500); Broadway Realty, 
Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 49 App. Div. 2d 422, 376 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1975) 
($500); State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Speer, 35 App. Div. 2d 107, 313 N.Y.S.2d 28 
(1970), rev'd and remanded for determination of damages, 29 N. Y.2d 555, 324 N. Y.S.2d 297, 
272 N.E.2d 884 (1971) ($500); School Dist. No. I, Multnomah County, Ore. v. Nilsen, 17 
Ore. App. 601, 523 P.2d 1041 (1974), rev'don other grounds, 271 Ore. 461, 534 P.2d 1135 
(1975) ($700); Lamb v. Salles, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976) ($750); Hughes v. Dyer, 378 
F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mo. 1974) ($750); Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 
399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973) ($750); Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34 (N .D. Ohio, 1976), ($1500 
awarded to husband and wife - may include damages for non-psychological injury as well); 
Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973) ($861.75); Mendota Apartments v. 
D.C. Comm'n of Human Rights, 315 A.2d 832 (D.C. 1974) ($1000); Span v. Pa. Human 
Rights Comm'n, 15 Pa. Commw. Ct. °334, 325 A.2d 678 (1974) ($1000); McNeil v. P-N & S, 
Inc., 372 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ga. 1973) ($2500 to two plaintiffs); Clemons v. Runck, 402 F. 
Supp. 863 (S.D. Ohio 1975) ($1500 - includes damages for non-psychologii;al injury as well); 
Stevens v. Dobs, Inc.,-373 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.C. 1974) ($1500); McCrary v. Runyon, 515 
F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), affd, 427 U.S. 160, 166 n.4 (1976) ($2000); Boumewood Hosp. v. 
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 358 N .E. 2d 235 (1976) ($2000); Loyal 
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were determined by judges or administrative bodies, not by juries.49 
Judges have not hesitated to exercise their power of remittitur to reduce 
jury verdicts they find "excessive" in light of the evidence presented. 50 
Although the number of cases on which the observation is based is small, 
judges and administrative decision-makers appear to be less likely then 
juries to award substantial mental distress damages in discrimination 
cases. 51 
Significant barriers to the recovery of substantial mental distress dam-
ages are inherent in litigation of discrimination claims. Many states, for 
example, require that discrimination claims be heard by an administrative 
board either exclusively or as a prerequisite to the initiation of a civil 
action for damages. 52 Such boards, however, often lack jurisdiction to 
hear claims for monetary damages. 53 Therefore, in order to pursue a claim 
for damages in these states, victims of discrimination must either initiate 
actions in multiple forums or delay their damage actions until they acquire 
a favorable administrative determination of the defendant's liability. The 
potential costs of subsequently bringing a claim for mental distress in a 
state court may often significantly outweigh the likely benefits, even 
though some state discrimination statutes permit attorney's fee awards to 
be awarded to successful plaintiffs.54 In addition, some jurisdictions place 
Order of Moose No. 145 v. Pa. Human Rights Comm'n, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 433, 328 A.2d 
180 (1974) ($2500); Allen v. Gifford, 368 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973) ($3500 - includes 
damages for non-psychological injury as well); Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage 
Co., 430 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1977) ($5000 "compensatory" damages); Buckholtz v. 
Symons Mfg. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1084 (E.D. Wisc. 1978) ($7500); Parker v. 
Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ($10,000); Coates v. National Cash Register 
Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va 1977) ($15,000); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r, 404 F. 
Supp. 324 (D.N .J. 1975) ($750,000 remitte to $200,000), mental distress award vacated, 550 
F. 2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 749 (1978). The figures cited represent the 
damages awarded by the trial court, adjusted by remittitur or appellate modification on 
evidentiary grounds, but without regard to appellate reversal on statutory grounds. Cases in 
which claimants received mental distress awards after appellate review are listed in note 5 
supra. 
49 See cases cited in note 48 supra. 
50 See, e.g., Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975) 
($750,000 verdict remitted to $200,000); Broadway Realty v. New York State Div. of Human 
Rights, 49 App. Div. 2d 422, 376 N. Y.S.2d 17 ( 1975) ($500 award reduced to $100 on appeal). 
51 See Lichtman, supra note 7, at 966 n.16. Of the eleven cases cited in note 48 supra. in 
which more than $1000 was awarded, four cases involved jury damage verdicts, three of 
which are the three highest damage awards listed. See Clemons v. Runck, 402 F. Supp. 863 
(S.D. Ohio 1975); Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Coates v. National 
Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r, 
404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N .J. 1975), mental distress award vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977). 
52 See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-301 (Cum. Supp. I 1977) (exclusive adminis-
trative remedy for non-public employees). 
53 See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St. 2d 217, 313 N.E.2d 3 (1974), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975); Mendota Apartments v. D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, 315 
A.2d 832 (D.C. 1974); Zamantakis v. Commonwealth Human Rights Comm'n, 10 Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 107, 308 A.2d 612 (1973); Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758 
(Iowa 1971); State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Speer, 35 App. Div. 2d 107. 313 N.Y.S. 2d 
28 (1970). 
54 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1518, § 5 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 4-33-11 
(1975) ($1000 limit). 
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statutory limits on the amount of compensatory damage awards in dis-
crimination cases. 55 
C. Focus of Reform 
Present standards for the award of mental distress damages in discrimi-
nation cases are far less restrictive that former "intentional infliction of 
mental distress" standards. Victims of discrimination no longer need to 
prove the "outrageousness" of the defendant's conduct nor the "severe" 
nature of their mental distress as conditions precedent to recovery. Pre-
sent standards purport to place no greater burden on plaintiffs than in 
most tort contexts; however, they have generated very few large damage 
verdicts for plaintiffs. 
Some barriers to substantial recovery are derived directly from the 
requirements of certain discrimination statutes and may only be removed 
by legislative reform. Other barriers appear related to the evidentiary 
standards that victims of discrimination must meet and can be eliminated 
by the judiciary. These latter barriers arise from the difficulty of proving 
the adverse psychological effects of discrimination and judicial skepticism 
about the propriety of compensating the discrimination injury. These 
impediments, as the remainder of this article will urge, are ones that 
courts and administrative boards can and should remove without further 
delay. 
II. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR THE AWARD OF MENTAL DISTRESS 
DAMAGES IN DISCRIMINATION CASES 
A. Tort Analogies 
The language commonly cited to advocate application of tort damage 
standards to discrimination cases is that of Justice Marshall in Curtis v. 
Loether:56 
An action to redress racial discrimination may also be likened 
to an action for defamation or intentional infliction of mental 
distress. Indeed, the contours of the latter tort are still develop-
ing, and it has been suggested that 'under the logic of the com-
mon law of insult and indignity, racial discrimination might be 
treated as a dignitary tort'. 57 
55 CAL. C1v. CODE§§ 52, 55 (West Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-127g 
31-128. 53-35. 53-36 (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 515-13(b)(7) (1976); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 37.2605(2)(i)-(i). 37.2802 (Supp. 1977-78); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 213.127 
(Vernon Supp. 1977-78); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§ 64-304 (Supp. 1977-78); NEB. REV. 
STAT.§ 20-118(6) (1977); NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 118.120, 651.090 (1977); OR. REV. STAT.§ 
30.680 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 34-37-5(L)(b) (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9. § 2461 (Supp. 
1977). tit. 21. § 495b (Supp. 1977). 
56 415 U.S. 189 (1974). See note 4 supra. 
57 415 U.S. at 196 n. 10. 
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Justice Marshall's comments are provocative because they suggest the 
desirability of compensating consequences of discrimination as tortious 
injuries. The mention of defamation and the intentional infliction of men-
tal distress as equally valid tort analogies, however, muddles the formula-
tion of proper evidentiary standards for the award of mental distress 
damages in discrimination cases. As previously shown,58 the evidentiary 
requirements for proving intentional infliction of mental distress are very 
strict and courts seldom apply them in discrimination cases. The common 
law of defamation, on the other hand, represents the branch of dignitary 
tort law providing the most liberal compensation for the psychological 
consequences of dignitary injury because it employs a presumption of 
general damages and often requires a showing of only minimal actual 
irtjury. 59 Nevertheless, this latter branch of tort law has been ignored by 
courts and commentators who support application of "tort" damage 
standards to discrimination cases.60 
Defamation awards are intended to compensate injuries to the plain-
tiff's reputation and, some commentators have argued, the consequential 
loss in emotional tranquility. 61 The difficulties of ascertaining the extent 
of intangible injury are avoided by presuming the existence of such irtjury 
in certain categories of defamatory publication. 62 For example, oral 
statements that impute to the plaintiff a serious crime, a loathsome dis-
ease, a lack of chastity, or qualities incompatible with his trade or busi-
ness,63 as well as printed statements deemed "defamatory on their face" 
are held so likely to cause damage to reputation that such cases, absent 
First Amendment considerations, can be submitted to juries without any 
proof of actual loss. 64 Even if the defamation does not fit into one of the 
58 See notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra. 
59 This is especially true of the common law of defamation prior to recent constitutional 
modification. See note 64 infra. 
60 See articles cited in notes 6 & 7 supra. 
61 Cf. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 510. 
62 Id. at 512. 
63 Dispelling the notion that such categorizations are losing their vitality are cases such as 
Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975), in which the Utah Supreme Court significantly 
expanded the "business" category of slander per se. Id. at 1328. 
64 See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 512; Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 538 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 
1976). 
The presumption of damages in defamation cases was directly confronted by the Supreme 
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), a case involving press defamation 
of non-public figures. Rather that apply the "knowledge of reckless disregard" standard of 
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964), the court adopted an intermediate negligence 
stndard of liability somewhat less protective of defendants' First Amendment interests. 
Fearing that the intermediate standard alone would not adequately protect First Amendment 
rights' from the "chill" created by the threat of large jury verdicts, the majority in Gertz 
found it necessary "to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or 
reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury." 418 U.S. at 349 (em-
phasis added). The majority defined "actual injury" in expansive language, declaring that 
such injury "is not limited to out-of-pocket loss" and includes "the more customary types of 
actual harm" such as "impairment of reputation, and standing in the community, personal 
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." 418 U.S. at 349-50 (emphasis added). 
The Gertz requirement the mental distress be proven rather than presumed is not appro-
priately applied to most discrimination cases. Few discrimination defendants can assert 
constitutional interests of the integrity of freedom of expression in their defense. Moreover, 
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categories of per se liability, most courts hold that upon a showing of 
consequential pecuniary loss or "special damages," the cause of action 
for general damages can be submitted to the fact-finder as if defamation 
per se had been proven. 65 
The fact-finder in defamation cases is free to make its own reasonable 
estimate of a plaintiffs probable loss of reputation in the community, 
lessened esteem among peers, and most significantly in the view of some 
courts, damage to emotional tranquility. 66 Defendants bear the burden of 
coming forward with evidence rebutting or mitigating the reputational and 
mental distress elements of a plaintiffs damage action. 67 Furthermore, 
courts sometimes increase the defendant's burden by barring, as unduly 
prejudicial, evidence showing, for example, that the plaintiff possessed 
such a callous disposition that any mental distress suffered due to the 
defendant's actions could not have been of substantial severity.68 
The concept of "presumed" damages is not confined to the t9rt of 
defamation. In civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,69 the courts 
have developed an element of damages that may best be characterized as 
compensation for "the loss of civil rights per se. " 70 This award is de-
the Gertz language suggests that those victims who satisfy the more demanding N. Y. Times 
standard of defendant liability, by showing that the defamation was perpetrated "know-
ingly" or "in reckless disregard" of the consequences, may still receive the benefit of 
presumed damages. Similarly, many illegal acts of discrimination are "knowingly" perpet-
rated, if not perpetrated in "reckless disregard" of anti-discrimination laws. 
65 See Prosser, supra note I, at 761, citing Day, Mental Suffering as an Element of 
Damages in Defamation Cases. 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 26 (1966), in which the artificiality 
of the "special damage" requirement is examined and criticized. 
66 See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 514, and the discussion of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323 ( 1974) in note 64 supra. See also Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 538 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 
1976) (Maryland Jaw); Jones v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 459 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(Michigan law); Fuqua Television, Inc. v. Fleming, 134 Ga. App. 731, 215 S. E.2d 694 (1975). 
The Supreme Court in Carey v. Piphus, 46 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4228 (1978), discussed in notes 
72-77 infra, noted that 
The doctrine [of presumed damages in the common Jaw of defamation per se J has 
been defended on the grounds that those forms of defamation that are actionable 
per se are virtually certain to cause serious injury to reputation, and that this kind 
of injury is extremely difficult to prove. See Gertz v. Welch, supra, at 373, 376 
(WHITE, J ., dissenting). [footnote omitted] Moreover, statements that are de-
famatory per se by their very nature are likely to cause mental and emotional 
distress, as well as injury to reputation, so there arguably is little reason to require 
proof of this kind of injury either. 
67 See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 515-16. 
68 /d. at 516-17. See Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 265 A.2d 404, 416 
(1970), discussed in note 43 supra. 
69 Enacted by the Congress of 1871. 42 U .S.C. § 1983 (1974) provides in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any ... regulation, custom, or usage of any 
State ... subjects. or causes to be subjected, any ... person ... to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges. or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit on equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. -
70 Niles, Civil Actions for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEX. L. 
REv. 1015, 1034 (1967) speaks of§ 1983 damages as an award for "deprivation of civil 
rights," which is neither wholly punitive nor compensatory. Note, Measuring Damages for 
Violations of Individuals' Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. L. REV. 357 (1974), discusses two 
types of§ 1983 damages, one of which is characterized as damages for violation of "con-
stitutional rights alone." The second type is an action for consequential damages, including 
damages for mental distress, which result directly from a defendant's action which may be 
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signed to compensate persons for intangible injuries caused by the loss of 
legal rights alone, independent of physical injury or monetary damage 
caused by a defendant State agent's actions.7 1 Although some courts have 
viewed this award as compensation for "a taking" of legal rights, 72 the 
injury redressed is a purely psychological one, representing the shock, 
disgust, and disappointment experienced when a government agent vio-
lates rights that the law guarantees. 73 Though the Supreme Court in Carey 
v. Piphus 74 has hL;j that only nominal damages may be presumed in a 
section 1983 action for deprivation of procedural due process rights, 75 the 
independently tortious, such as placement in solitary confinement, Taylor v. Clement, 433 
F. Supp. 585 (S.D.N .Y. 1977), use of unnecessary force in arrest, McArthur v. Pennington, 
253 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), or refusal to provide emergency care to one to whom 
the defendant owes a duty, Shannon v. Lester, 519 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1975). This element of 
damages is not presumed by the courts and must be proven by plaintiffs, similar to 
negligence cases and statutory discrimination actions. See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 
209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring). But see Guzman v. Western State Bank 
of Devils Lake, 540 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1976). It is noteworthy, however, that courts have not 
imposed "physical injury'• requirements as in other tort contexts. See notes 29 and 30 
supra. 
71 Rivera Morales v. Benitez de Rexach, 541 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1976) (patronage firing in 
violation of associational rights; $10,000 for "pain and suffering"); Endress v. Brookdale 
Community College, 144 N.J. Super. 109, 141-43, 364 A.2d 1080, 1097-98 (1976) (discharge 
without due process; $10,000 award reduced to $2500); Bruce v. Board of Regents for 
Northwest Mo. State Univ., 414 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (discharge without due 
process; damage hearing ordered); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515. 523 F.2d 
569 (7th Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976) (discharge without due process; 
remanded for damage determination); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975) (picketer's freedom of speech violated; remanded 
for damage determination); Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(unlawful arrest; $3500). See also Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (jury can 
award damages to demonstrators arrested in violation of first and fourth amendment rights 
on class-wide basis, but only for losses of rights "actually sustained" and not based on 
"platitudes about priceless rights"; jury award of $7500 per plaintiff found excessive). 
72 In Carey v. Piphus, 46 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4226 (1968), discussed in notes 74-76 infra, the 
Supreme Court rejected respondents' characterization of§ 1983 damages as compensation 
for deprivations of "constitutional rights ... valuable in and of themselves." Rather, the 
Court accepted petitioners' contention that "the basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award 
should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional 
rights." (emphasis added). Hence, the focus in § 1983 cases is the compensation of 
psychological injury actually suffered by complainants. The issue before the Court in Carey 
was the circumstances under which fact-finders may presume such injury to have occurred, 
relieving complainants of the burden of coming forward with evidence of actual emotional 
injury. 
73 See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 731. 
74 46 U.S.L.W. 4224 (1978). 
75 In Carey. a district court found that although public school officials had suspended two 
students for justifiable reasons. they had failed to accord those students requisite procedural 
due process in doing so. The district court refused to award damages under§ 1983 because 
plaintiffs put forth no evidence of actual psychological injury resulting from the absence of 
an appropriate opportunity to be heard. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
reversed and remanded, 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), holding that plaintiffs were entitled to 
recover substantial compensatory damages simply because they had been denied due 
process and that plaintiffs were not obligated to prove any individualized injury. 
The Supreme Court reversed the seventh circuit, limiting its discussion to the award of 
presumed damages in procedural due process cases. The Court cited three reasons for its 
holding that in such cases, absent proof of actual psychological injury, aggrieved parties are 
entitled to recover only nominal damages "not to exceed one dollar." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4229. 
First, distinguishing the award of presumed damages in defamation per se cases, the Court 
held that it is "not reasonable to assume that every departure from procedural due process, 
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Court's decision suggests that courts may continue to presume substantial 
damages for emotional harm where certain "substantive" legal rights 
have been violated. 76 Where presumed damages are authorized under 
section 1983, it is difficult to imagine, and no court has indicated, what 
type of evidence a defendant mig'1t put forth in rebuttal or mitigation of 
damages. 
B. Application to Discrimination 
The preceding consideration of common Jaw defamation and section 
1983 "statutory tort" actions clearly shows that "tort law" is not uniform 
in its approach to compensating mental distress injury, and in some 
contexts provides substantial monetary damages to compensate for 
psychological injury. In affording mental distress damages under dis-
crimination statutes that do not outline evidentiary standards, courts 
should draw on the full range of tort damage theories to develop eviden-
tiary presumptions and inferences that accommodate the peculiar nature 
of the discrimination injury and the difficulties of its proof. 77 
Judicial power to create evidentiary presumptions derives from the 
inherent authority of judges to institute sensible and time-saving eviden-
tiary rules that allow certain inferences to be shown unless contrary 
evidence is presented. 78 Traditionally, the exercise of this discretion has 
no matter what the circumstances or how minor," is inherently likely to cause the aggrieved 
party mental distress, especially where the deprivation of the complainant's underlying 
substantive interest was justified. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4228. Second, because§ 1983 provides no 
relief for injuries caused by justified deprivations of substantive interests, it is important that 
the aggrieved party demonstrate that he suffered distress "because of the denial of pro-
cedural due process itself." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4228. Finally, the Court envisioned "no 
particular difficulty in producing evidence" of such a causal link; as in defamation cases, 
genuine injury, "although essentially subjective ... may be evidenced by one's conduct and 
observed by others." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4228, n. 20. 
76 The Court commented, 46 U.S.L.W. at 4228-29: 
The Court of Appeals believed ... that cases dealing with awards of damages for 
racial discrimination, the denial of voting rights, and the denial of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, support a presumption of damages where procedural due 
process is denied .... [llhe elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages 
appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional 
right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the depriva-
tion of another. ... [T]hese issues must be considered with reference to the nature 
of the interests protected by the particular constitutional right in question. For this 
reason, and without intimating an opinion as to their merits, we do not deem the 
cases relied upon to be controlling. 
11 In Carey v. Piphus, the Supreme Court expressed an identical philosophy with regard 
to the interpretation of§ 1983: 
In order to further the purpose of§ 1983, the rules governing compensation for 
injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the 
interests protected by the particular right in question-just as the common-law 
rules of damages themselves were defined by the interests protected in the various 
branches of tort law. 
46 U.S.L.W. at 4227. 
18 See McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. Cleary ed. 
1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]. See also E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVI-
DENCE 32-33 (1963) ("to produce a result in accord with the preponderance of probability"); 
Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918) (Holmes, J.) ("common experience shows 
the facts to be so generally true that courts may notice the truth"). 
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been motivated by strong social policies favoring one class of litigants 
over another. 79 The "make whole" purpose of discrimination statutes80 is 
consistent with evidentiary presumptions in favor of victims of discrimi-
nation, especially for those who have already proven illegal discrimina-
tion. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held in cases involving sections 
1982, 1983, and 1988 that the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 81 au-
thorize courts to tum to state common law principles where these stat-
utory provisions are inadequate to fulfill federal remedial purposes. 82 
The strong likelihood that plaintiffs will have suffered substantial men-
tal distress is a further reason for raising an evidentiary presumption of 
mental distress for those who raise meritorious claims in many types of 
discrimination cases. The presumption would be most appropriate for 
conduct which is clearly discriminatory and cannot be supported by any 
legitimate justifications, since such conduct often unequivocally com-
municates a message of inferiority. Presumptions may also be appropriate 
in cases that involve modes of discrimination which are more subtle yet 
affect benefits and opportunities crucial to the victim's well-being, such 
as retention of a job. 
The beneficiary of a presumption of mental distress would be entitled to 
recover a minimum award of damages without introducing any evidence 
of injury, although victims would of course be free to present medical or 
other evidence of emotional distress. Defendants could rebut such pre-
sumptions with adequate evidence. For example, evidence that the victim 
acted solely for the purpose of encouraging a defendant's well-known 
discriminatory behavior with no genuine desire to seek the defendant's 
services might suffice to rebut a presumption of mental distress. Courts 
might also rely on other unusual circumstances, especially where a plain-
tiff has suffered no physical or economic loss as a result of a defendant's 
discrimination, to rebut the presumption. 83 
79 See McCORMICK, supra note 78. 
80 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Franks v. Bowman Transp. 
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (Title VII); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 
(1975) (1866 Civil Rights Act). 
81 See notes 5, 6, 24 & 69-71 supra. 
82 Indeed, there is a growing line of§ 1982 cases, see note 5 supra, which, despite the lack 
of "state" involvement, have awarded what appear to be§ 1983 damages for the violation of 
civil rights per se. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra: see also Carey v. Piphus, 
46 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4228-29, n. 22 (1978); Williams v. Matthews Co., 419 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 
1974); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., Inc., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Sol D. Adler 
Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1971); Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mo. 
1974). In Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977), a§ 1982 suit between private parties 
concerning the discriminatory denial of an apartment, a claimant testified that she was not 
upset when she discovered the defendant's discriminatory motive and did not feel as though 
she was entitled to damages for emotional distress. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit held that 
the claimant was entitled to "at least nominal damages" because she was denied "a 
constitutional right" from which "damage could be presumed." 558 F.2d at 287-88. Similar 
language has also appeared in housing discrimination cases under Title VIII. See Stevens v. 
Dobs, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.C. 1974); McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 658 
(N.D. Ga. 1973). See also WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 49.60.225 (Supp. 1976) (up to $1000 
"for the loss of the right to be free from discrimination."). 
83 See Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977), where a claimant's awareness of her 
legal remedy prevented her from becoming upset when she learned of the defendant's 
discrimination. 
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C. Limitations of the Presumed Damage Approach 
A presumption of mental distress injury, even in a limited range of 
discrimination contexts, would be vulnerable to a number of criticisms. 
There is no express statutory support for such a concept, and its adoption 
would exacerbate the perennial concern for "run-away" jury verdicts. 
Furthermore, although a statutory presumption might result in an in-
crease in the number of awards, it would not necessarily lead to signifi-
cantly greater mental distress awards, especially in courts that have 
traditionally disfavored the mental distress remedy. 
A presumption of mental distress injury would be virtually impossible 
to rebut. A defendant would face great difficulty in disproving the exis-
tence of an intangible condition about which the victims have virtually 
exclusive knowledge. Moreover, defendants would have very little access 
to information concerning the quantum of mental distress compensation 
due to a victim of discrimination, in contrast to the presumption of back 
pay imposed upon proof of certain Title VII employment discrimination 
violations.84 These same criticisms, however, can be made of the present 
mental distress compensation philosophy even though it does not provide 
for a presumption of mental distress. Under the present compensation 
philosophy, the difficulty of rebutting plaintiff testimony concerning in-
tangible emotional injury has led to attacks on victim credibility and 
attempted proof of the victim's hardened disposition. A presumption 
would lessen the necessity for such exchanges of testimony, which place 
a premium on the ability of victims to describe complex, intangible 
feelings and to field questions from defendants of dubious relevance. In 
addition, these exchanges usually waste time, and are often needlessly 
prejudicial to the victim. 
Opposition to such a virtually irrebuttable presumption may be tem-
pered by limiting its application to cases in which it is most appropriate. 
In Title VIII housing discrimination cases, for example, courts have 
awarded mental distress damages not only to victims of discrimination, 
but to spouses85 and even co-tenants of the victims. 86 Although the 
anguish of such third parties should be considered a compensable injury, 
84 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 491 (4th Cir., 1971) cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 
1006, 1007 (1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). 
85 In Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976), both spouses of an interracial 
marriage received an award for the humiliation and emotional anguish they experienced 
when their landlord evicted them after discovering that Mrs. Sallee was black. See also 
Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34 (N .D. Ohio 1976) ($1500 awarded to interracial couple); 
Hodge v. Seiler. 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977) ($500 awarded to black husband; "at least 
nominal damages" must be awarded to white wife). 
"
6 In Walker v. Fox. 395 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Ohio 1975), a white tenant recovered $500 
for mental distress in a Title VIII action. initiated after the tenant had witnessed her landlord 
misrepresent the availability of an apartment to a prospective black tenant. The Walker 
decision is an extension of the Supreme Court's opinion in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 ( 1972), where the Court held that under Title VIII a tenant in the 
housing unit from which a prospective tenant is discriminatorily excluded can allege the 
requisite "injury in fact" to maintain standing to challenge his landlord's actions. 409 U.S. 
at 210, 212. 
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the less predictable nature of the irtjury and the greater likelihood that 
such parties would be encouraged to raise fictitious claims strongly 
suggest that a presumption in their favor would be inappropriate. A claim 
for mental distress damages on behalf ofa large class, particularly in cases 
of employment discrimination, may also be an inappropriate occasion for 
invoking the presumption. The employer or union who maintains a dis-
criminatory promotional system87 or who uses hiring criteria that are 
unrelated to the job and disproportionately exclude disfavored groups, 88 
inflicts disappointments and frustrations upon many employees. To estab-
lish a presumption of mental distress injury on behalf of a large class, 
however, is to expose defendants to enormous and virtually unavoidable 
liability. Though the nature of the employment discrimination injury 
seems highly deserving of mental distress compensation, only recently 
has there been a realistic proposal for making such damages available 
under federal anti-discrimination statutes. 89 Perhaps imposing a presump-
tion of mental distress damages only in single-plaintiff discrimination 
cases makes sense, for damage claims in those cases most closely resem-
ble standard tort actions. 
Ill. Su MMARY & CONCLUSION 
The recognition that discrimination is a tort-like injury meriting tort-like 
remedies has led to the increasing availability of mental distress damages 
under federal and state discrimination statutes. Yet the evidentiary stand-
ards for the award of mental distress damages are not mandated by the 
terms of discrimination statutes; judges determine the requisites for pro-
ving compensable mental distress. The philosophy of compensation for 
mental distress that courts have adopted in discrimination cases is in 
some ways more restrictive than the compensation philosophy courts 
have adopted in analogous dignitary tort contexts. As the availability of 
the mental distress remedy proliferates, courts should be sensitive to the 
circumstances characterizing various types of discrimination cases and 
should adjust the evidentiary standards for the award of mental distress 
damages accordingly, just as they have done in the various tort contexts 
in which mental distress damages have traditionally been available. 
This article advocates the adoption of evidentiary presumptions in 
favor of certain victims of discrimination who suffer mental distress. Such 
a presumption, if widely adopted, might insure that mental distress claims 
of discrimination victims will be seriously considered, and that most 
87 Local 189, United Papermakers and Papeiworkers v. United States, 416 F.2ci 980 (5th 
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); but see International Bro. of Teamsters v. 
United States (T.I.M.E.-D.C.), _ U.S. _, 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977). 
88 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
89 See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975), supra note 
5. 
FALL 1977) Mental Distress Damages 141 
defendants will be compensated for mental distress. Small verdicts in the 
absence of defendant rebuttal evidence might give appellate courts a 
firmer basis for evaluating and modifying such awards. Most importantly, 
however, the presumption would recognize the legitimacy and serious-
ness of the mental distress injury, the quintessential discrimination harm. 
-Harold J. Rennett 
